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Resumo
Uma Europa Global? Ambição e Limites da 
Política Externa Europeia
Existem várias razões para a debilidade da polí‑ 
tica externa da União Europeia. Neste artigo, 
defendo que uma dessas razões resulta da falta 
de pensamento e empenhamento estratégico da 
União Europeia. Os países europeus – tanto 
através da UE como da NATO – têm identificado 
correctamente o crescente desafio resultante da 
globalização. Este traz vastas oportunidades e 
novas ameaças, que a Europa deve explorar e 
confrontar.
No entanto, apesar da avaliação estratégica ser a 
correcta, a política adoptada é errada. A Europa 
necessita de recuperar o seu propósito, mas atra‑
vés dos seus próprios esforços políticos.
Abstract
There are many reasons behind Europe’s weak foreign 
policy footprint. In this article I will argue that one 
critically important cause is Europe’s lack of strategic 
thinking and engagement. European countries – both 
via the EU and NATO – rightly pinpoint a growing 
challenge in the shape of globalization. It brings vast 
opportunities and distinct new threats, and Europe 
must exploit these opportunities just as it must 
confront the threats. However, while Europe has its 
assessment right, it has its politics wrong. Europe needs 
to recover its purpose by its own political efforts.
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european	 countries	 continue	 to	 labor	 in	 favor	 of	 stronger	 common	 foreign	
policy institutions. The vision is simple – to gain greater influence and help shape 
a benevolent order – but the politics are difficult. There is first of all a plethora 
of	 common	 institutions	 that	 are	proving	hard	 to	 reform.	The	european	 countries	
have	 gone	 through	 about	 a	 decade’s	 worth	 of	 constitutional	 reform	 in	 the	 eU,	
resulting in the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force in December 2009. In NATO, 
and prodded by the United States, the European allies have sought to “transform” 
the Alliance ever since 2001‑2002. Neither reform track has proven amendable to 
major change. In the EU, the making of a new president and foreign minister have 
solved	 little	 in	 terms	of	 complexity,	 rather	 adding	 to	 the	 existing	many	 layers	 of	
authority	competing	to	drive	policy.1	 in	nATO,	transformation	has	 lost	 its	breath	
and sense of direction and the Alliance has wisely sought to take stock rather than 
driving forward blindly: a new Strategic Concept is due out in November 2010. It 
will confirm Europe’s vision to become relevant on the big international issues but 
not	efface	the	underlying	questions	regarding	organization,	capacity,	and	ultimately	
political	will.
There are many reasons behind Europe’s weak foreign policy footprint but 
in this article I will argue that one critically important cause is Europe’s lack of 
strategic thinking and engagement. European countries – both via the EU and 
nATO	 –	 rightly	 pinpoint	 a	 growing	 challenge	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 globalization.	 it	
brings	vast	opportunities	and	distinct	new	threats,	and	europe	must	exploit	these	
opportunities just as it must confront the threats. However, while Europe has 
its	 assessment	 right,	 it	 has	 its	 politics	 wrong.	 european	 countries	 instinctively	
emphasize globalization as a kind of managerial challenge whereby the EU and 
NATO must work comprehensively with each other and other organizations 
such	as	 the	United	nations	 in	order	 to	manage	complex	problems.	This	 is	 liberal	
management	according	to	which	cooperation	can	tame	radical	politics	(in	the	shape	
of	nationalism,	religion,	or	ideology)	and	bring	progress.	Those	who	cooperate	are	
reasonable	actors	who	share	a	 liberal	 commitment.	The	problem	with	 this	 line	of	
thinking is its neglect of history and culture and the way in which actors – Europe 
and	others	–	gain	purpose	not	only	by	subscribing	to	a	grand	idea	(liberalism)	but	
by looking into their own histories. Europe today is all grand idea and no history, 
to put it bluntly: it is not clear what “Europe” – or “the EU” or “NATO” – means 
in	 a	 globalizing	world.	Unsurprisingly,	 policy	 that	 is	 bereft	 of	meaning	will	 also	
be	bereft	of	purpose	and	impact.
 1 The new offices created by the Lisbon Treaty are formally entitled President of the European 
council	and	High	Representative	of	the	Union	for	Foreign	Affairs	and	Security	Policy.
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Europe cannot fix this problem by tinkering with institutions or embracing	
the	Un	to	 solve	problems	 in	Somalia,	Yemen,	 the	 ivory	coast,	or	 somewhere	else.	
Europe needs to recover its purpose by its own political efforts. This is difficult but	
not	 impossible,	 as	 the	 conclusion	 suggests.	 Section	 1	 of	 the	 paper	 describes	 the	
globalization	orthodoxy	 to	which	 the	eU	and	nATO	subscribe	and	which	 inspires	
current	 reform	efforts.	 Section	2	 turns	 to	Afghanistan	and	 the	 troubles	 the	Afghan	
mission	reveals	in	terms	of	european	and	Transatlantic	unity,	which	in	important	ways	
run counter to the orthodoxy. Section 3, the final section, examines the deeper causes 
of	the	clash	between	ambition	and	capacity	and	suggests	pathways	of	real	reform.
Europe’s	globalized	Mission
In the course of the new century, following the terrorist attacks of September 
2001, it became fashionable to suggest a radical make‑over of both the EU and 
nATO.	These	institutions	should	cease	being	focused	on	europe	and	its	geostrategic	
approaches	but	commit	in	earnest	to	underlying	democratic	ideals	and	embrace	a	
wider	and	global	mission.	european	countries	did	move	 into	action,	 though	 they	
also sought to leave their distinct mark on the global engagement. Europe saw 
the	 same	 threats	 as	 the	 United	 States,	 which	 was	 clear	 from	 nATO’s	 Article	 5	
declaration and the European Security Strategy propelled by the EU’s Javier Solana, 
but	the	approach	to	them	differed.2	The	eSS	distinguished	itself	by	its	emphasis	on	
“effective multilateralism,” an outlook that entered also NATO as the United States 
prepared	for	war	in	iraq	and	the	Alliance	split	on	the	issue.
The	United	States	has	been	a	consistent	and	important	source	of	europe’s	global	
orientation.	President	W.	Bush	made	it	a	priority	of	his	presidency,	which	brought	
controversy to NATO summits in Riga in 2006 and Bucharest in 2008 on the issues 
of global partnerships and Ukraine and Georgia’s membership, respectively. But 
the agenda has not only been presidential. Influential opinion‑makers have sought 
to push the United States to seek a “world of liberty under law” – as the Princeton 
Project of 2006 put it – and some members of Congress, Senator McCain foremost 
among them, picked up the idea of a League of Democracies and promoted it.
 2 The threats identified in the December 2003 ESS were terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional 
conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a 
Better World (Brussels 2003).
 3 G. John Ikenberry and Anne‑Marie Slaughter directed the Princeton Project on US National 
Security, whose final report was Forging a World of Liberty under Law (September 2006).
	 21	 Nação e Defesa
The	 push	 did	 not	 always	 bear	 fruit.	nATO’s	 partnership	 policy	 did	 not	 gain	
a global architecture, and Ukraine and Georgia remain outside both NATO and 
the	 eU.	 The	 League	 of	democracies	 has	 come	 and	 gone,	 and	President	Obama’s	
multilateral	 bent	 has	 brought	 relief	 to	 europe.	Yet	 the	 push	 continues.	 President	
Obama is no less global in his outlook than his predecessor and he wants US 
allies and partners to join him in missions outside Europe. European countries, it 
is expected, must continue to break out of the confines of European security and 
organize	real	and	important	contributions	to	security	missions	in	Afghanistan	and	
elsewhere. Having warmly welcomed his presidency, European countries will find 
it	harder	to	say	no	to	Obama.
The EU is willing but not so able. President Van Rompuy finds his authority 
contested	 for	 the	 simple	 reason	 that	 his	 formal	 powers	 are	 new,	 growing	 out	 of	
the	Lisbon	Treaty,	and	has	found	his	energies	consumed	by	the	euro	crisis	that	at	
one moment threatened the common currency itself, a key pillar in the European 
edifice. The new high representative, Catherine Ashton, has had difficulties getting 
her	foreign	service	off	the	ground,	with	the	european	external	Action	Service	being	
the object of power struggles among the old EU institutions. In September 2010, the 
internal	quarrelling	spilled	over	into	the	Un	and	undermined	the	eU’s	campaign	to	
upgrade	its	observer	status	in	the	General	Assembly.	The	eU’s	new	players,	President	
Van	Rompuy	and	High	Representative	Ashton,	though	intended	to	enhance	the	eU’s	
voice and influence now that the EU has become a legal personality (previously it 
was only the European Community), thus remain on the UN back benches next to 
the	Vatican	and	other	negligible	actors.
NATO has likewise been willing but not able, though maybe slightly more able 
because	 the	United	States	 is	 inside	 the	organization	 to	drive	affairs.	At	one	point	
NATO was stuck. This was in 2003‑2007 when the War on Terror divided the allies 
to	the	point	that	they	gave	up	on	renewing	their	1999	Strategic	concept.	instead	they	
settled for an improved military guidance in the shape of the 2006 Comprehensive 
Political	Guidance	–	which	eschewed	the	big	political	issues,	its	title	in	spite.	This	
could	 not	 last	 and	 the	 Alliance	 decided	 in	 Bucharest	 to	 hold	 off	 the	 process	 of	
change until the 60th anniversary summit of April 2009. Conveniently, it put the 
Alliance past the W. Bush presidency. Still, the 2009 Declaration on Alliance Security 
(dAS)	set	off	a	new	Strategic	concept	process	and	importantly	made	globalization	
the key issue to confront: “our security is increasingly tied to that of other regions” 
and NATO is “facing new and increasingly global threats.”4	The	dAS	was	a	north	
	 4	 nATO,	Declaration on Alliance Security, 4 April 2009.
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Atlantic Council (NAC) document and it framed the subsequent work delegated to 
an experts’ group under the chairmanship of Madeleine Albright. Like the NAC, 
the Albright report proceeds from the view that “the world has changed” in a 
globalizing	direction.5
The sum total is that Europe accepts the global challenge but has difficulties 
organizing its response. The EU is mainly working along economic and financial 
lines and could potentially make a distinct contribution to the global architecture 
here. Key EU members participate in the G8 and G20 but they need to agree among 
themselves, and they need to rework financial governance inside the EU in order 
to stabilize the Euro. NATO seeks to keep up with the pace of globalizing security 
threats.	 nATO’s	 Secretary	 General	 consistently	 tries	 to	 settle	 regional	 issues	 by	
reaching	out	to	Russia	as	well	as	the	eU	with	offers	of	new	partnership	in	order	to	
push the allies to wake up to the new reality of global threats. If we can only settle 
the	regional	issues,	the	Secretary	General	is	in	effect	saying,	then	we	can	focus	on	
the	real	business	of	global	security	management.
afghanistan:	a	Story	of	European	Limits
To	an	extent	europe	can	rely	on	the	United	States	to	provide	leadership	because	
securing	 stability	 in	 relation	 to	 Russia	 and	 Germany	 is	 an	 enduring	 American	
interest.	 The	 trouble	 for	 europe	 is	 that	 these	 enduring	 purposes	 have	 become	
inescapably	intertwined	with	global	missions.	Afghanistan	tells	us	why.	it	tells	us	
that	 the	United	States	 is	more	 than	 ever	 compelled	 to	 consider	eurasian	 security	
issues in their entirety. It may still entertain the idea of Eurasian “strong points” 
–	an	original	 idea	behind	nATO’s	 creation	–	but	globalization	has	 connected	 the	
points and demands an integrated strategy for the “world island,” as Halford 
Mackinder once labeled Eurasia. Afghanistan has thus become the meeting point 
for	the	US’	global	terrorist	concerns	and	its	european	alliance	policy.	it	is	a	meeting	
point with weaknesses.
Unity of Effort.	nATO	is	supposed	to	become	a	more	open	organization	in	order	
to	enable	the	comprehensive	Approach	–	a	type	of	open‑ended	cooperation	among	
multiple	security	actors	laboring	in	common	to	solve	security	problems.	it	is	a	wide	
agenda,	 involving	 not	 only	 military‑related	 organizations	 but	 in	 principle	 every	
organization able to impact on the security situation. Consequently, NATO seeks 
	 5	 Group	of	experts,	NATO 2020: Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement, 17 May 2010.
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partnership	with	the	Un	and	its	plethora	of	functional	agencies	and	organizations	
and,	at	a	european	level,	with	the	eU	and	the	OSce,	the	regional	handmaiden	of	
the	Un.
This is the design, and it enjoys widespread political backing. The problem is 
that it does not work. The comprehensive approach in Afghanistan has failed to take 
off	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	and	today	the	Afghan	ground	organizations	are	either	
American or ISAF/NATO. The EU has never really made a significant contribution to 
the	mission,	and	the	Un	has	struggled	but	largely	given	up	coordinating	the	effort,	
which	 it	 is	otherwise	supposed	to	do.	 in	Afghanistan	today	the	Un	is	playing	an	
important	role	 in	the	diplomacy	of	Kabul,	 it	should	be	recognized,	but	 its	muscle	
and	impact	in	respect	to	national	development	is	negligible.
This	can	be	explained	with	reference	to	various	historical	facts	related	to	iSAF	
but behind them lurks the reality of a dysfunctional UN‑NATO relationship. 
Key	 members	 of	 the	 UnSc	 –	 Russia	 and	 china	 –	 do	 not	 trust	 nATO,	 and	
neither	do	large	portions	of	the	Un	general	secretariat	staff,	which	embodies	the	
Cold War outlook that NATO’s business was war where the UN business was 
reconciliation and peace. UN Secretary General Ban‑ki Moon risked considerable 
capital when he in September 2008 signed a cooperation agreement between the 
Un	and	nATO	secretariats.	His	staff	urged	him	not	to	sign,	and	Russia	declared	
the	 whole	 deal	 illegal.	 The	 declaration	 could	 not	 be	 published,	 though	 it	 soon	
leaked, of course.
This	 leaves	nATO	–	 and	 all	 the	 allies	 and	 iSAF	partners	 –	 in	 an	 unfortunate	
position. It wants the UN to take the Afghan lead but it cannot and may not want 
to.	nATO	 troops	 are	 dying	 in	 a	Un	mandated	mission	 but	 the	Un	 tends	 to	 see	
the	mission	as	nATO’s	and	place	itself	somewhere	in	the	middle	between	nATO	
and	 the	Taliban.	This	 historical	 sense	 of	 evenhandedness,	 upheld	by	 the	Un	but	
disparaged	by	nATO,	undermines	the	sought	after	unity	of	effort	and	offers	food	
for	thought	for	proponents	of	the	type	of	broad	and	multilateral	engagement	that	
characterizes	european	diplomacy.
Unity of Command.	nATO	and	notably	the	United	States	have	in	consequence	done	
more to assume control of Afghan affairs and provide leadership. But this fall‑back 
option is not without flaws. NATO never acquired the unity of command that the 
iSAF	mission	 needs.	 iSAF’s	 expansion	 happened	within	 a	 fragmented	 command	
organization	 plagued	 by	 caveats	 and	 burden	 sharing	 debates.	 iSAF’s	 history	 is	
thus	 the	 history	 of	 how	willing	 allies	 operating	 in	 regional	 command	 south	 and	
east	strove	to	involve	other	allies	to	the	north	and	west	more,	and	how	these	allies	
resisted being put to work in a project they never fully accepted politically. ISAF 
was balkanized from day one, in other words.
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Improvements have been made. The London conference of January 2010 
reinforced NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative, newly appointed British Mark 
Sedwill,	 and	made	 him	 a	 political	 lead	 in	 the	 phase	 of	 transitioning	 to	Afghan	
lead in the PRTs and in security operations. Moreover, Sedwill works with a 
stronger and more focused US civilian effort led by Ambassador Eikenberry and 
a reinforced military (ISAF) leadership – with General Petraeus taking command 
in the summer of 2010.
Still,	the	improvements	have	not	brought	unity	of	command.	Kabul	operations	
–	 political	 as	 well	 as	 military	 –	 have	 improved	 but	 Brussels	 affairs	 in	 the	
political‑strategic headquarters have not significantly. The NAC has devolved 
leadership	 to	 iSAF	 in	 Kabul	 and	 hopes	 the	 renewed	 cOin	 (counterinsurgency)	
strategy,	including	its	encouragement	of	reconciliation	and	reintegration,	will	pay	off.	
The	nAc	is	supporting	the	effort	but	is	unable	to	really	direct	it	because	the	sense	
of	mission	is	not	there.	The	problem	is	compounded	by	the	additional	investments	
made by the Obama presidency, which makes it even harder for the NAC to assert 
collective	 leadership,	 and	 the	 desire	 of	 some	 allies	 such	 as	 the	netherlands	 and	
canada	to	begin	exiting	the	mission.
Strategic Outlook. To a large extent the problem boils down to one of outlook. 
Fearing the disintegrative effects of different outlooks, the allies eschew political 
and	strategic	debate.	Some	european	allies,	Germany	notable	among	them,	clamored	
for	more	strategic	debate	in	the	midst	of	the	iraq	war	and	Atlantic	controversy.	it	
was a good point – even if the criticism made everyone look bad.
nATO	has	been	notoriously	poor	 at	discussing	grand	 strategy.	 it	 intervenes	
in	 debates	 once	 they	 have	 found	 a	 focal	 point	 (Afghanistan,	 iraq,	 Somalia,	 or	
some other point), and the NAC then struggles to make sense of it. Typically, 
it	 defines	 an	 operation	 and	 then	 busies	 itself	 running	 and	 controlling	 it.	 The	
context	of	 the	mission	does	not	enter	 into	 the	equation.	The	nAc	does	not	deal	
with	the	regional	politics	of	Afghanistan	and	iSAF:	it	is	strictly	bound	by	its	iSAF	
mandate,	 though	 it	 need	 not	 be.	 nor	 does	 the	nAc	 discuss	 the	 politics	 of	 the	
Middle	east	or	 the	caucusus	–	 that	 important	stretch	of	 territory	 lying	between	
iSAF	and	itself.
nATO‑eU	 relations	 weigh	 in	 on	 this.	 France	 typically	 resists	 freewheeling	
discussions	 in	 nATO	 because	 their	 political	 ambitions	 are	 vested	 in	 the	 eU.	
Germany,	 historically	 bridging	 the	 two,	 is	 no	 advocate	 of	 a	 global	 nATO	 and	
therefore blocks attempts to bring in big issues, be they Middle Eastern war and 
peace or China’s rise. Things do not look brighter when seen from the citadel of 
the	 eU	council	 of	Ministers	where	 the	 same	 dividing	 lines	 appear.	 Rotating	 eU	
presidencies emphasizes large projects for their regions – the High North, the 
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Eastern dimension, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean – but the EU has found no 
way to integrate them. This competition among political projects helps explain why 
the	Lisbon	Treaty	institutions	headed	by	Van	Rompuy	and	Ashton	have	not	(yet)	
brought	about	the	unity	hoped	for.
the	balance	Sheet:	globalization	is	no	Purpose
Afghanistan	will	not	be	a	model	for	future	operations.	it	has	been	too	heavy	and	
difficult, and NATO needs an infusion of political purpose now that the Afghan 
mission	–	nATO’s	most	important	mission	ever	–	by	virtue	of	necessity	has	boiled	
down	 to	US	 leadership.	The	eU	has	been	 largely	absent	 from	Afghanistan	and	 is	
in	need	of	real	operational	visibility.
Globalization fits the bill for both organizations, as we saw. NATO’s purpose, 
we	hear	from	the	Alliance,	is	really	to	manage	globalization.	nATO’s	next	round	of	
Multinational Exercises (MNE) is set to focus on “the global commons” and NATO 
will, no doubt, eagerly work to realize the Comprehensive Approach that never took 
off in Afghanistan. The EU will define globalization more broadly, emphasizing the 
economic and financial dimensions that speak to its advantages.
Both organizations will likely fail to address the one overriding source of 
misfortune	in	the	Afghan	affair	and	which	is	political	purpose.	Unity	of	effort	and	
command	have	been	absent	because	the	purpose	was	never	there,	and	this	is	comes	
back to the same set of countries that make up the EU as well as NATO. It is of 
course	tempting	to	follow	the	orthodoxy	of	the	comprehensive	Approach	and	push	
the task of coordination into UN hands: it makes sense at some level because the 
Un	toolbox	is	the	widest	one	and	because	complex	problems	(combining	security,	
governance,	 and	 development)	 require	 complex	 solutions.	 At	 another	 level	 it	 is	
politically	naïve.	if	nATO	cannot	muster	the	political	strength	to	drive	a	coherent	
effort	 in	Afghanistan,	 there	 is	no	reason	 to	expect	 the	Un	to	be	able	 to.	War	–	 in	
all	 its	 guises	 –	 is	 an	 inherently	political	phenomenon,	 and	 its	 resolution	 requires	
political	 purpose	 and	 commitment	 that	 global	 technicians	 do	 not	 have	 in	 their	
toolbox:	it	 is	in	the	hands	of	political	leaders.
European countries have in effect bought into a liberal logic that mistakenly 
believes	that	politics	is	a	dirty	business	and	that	the	world	would	be	a	better	place	
if we could somehow control politics from the outside. This liberal project came 
of	 age	 in	 the	 late	 19th	 century	 and	 sought	 to	 rein	 in	 politics	 (hitherto	 dominated	
by	warmongering	 princes)	 via	 economic	 change,	 constitutional	 government,	 and	
social	progress.	Liberals	thus	built	a	wall	between	themselves	and	their	supposedly	
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progressive agenda on the one hand and the world of dirty political deal making 
on	 the	other.	The	 result	was	 catastrophic.	The	political	vacuum	 they	 created	was	
soon	 exploited	 by	 powerful	 populists	who	 enthusiastically	 led	 their	 nations	 into	
world	war.
nATO’s	strength	through	the	cold	War	was	 its	understanding	that	 liberalism	
had	 to	 be	 political	 –	 that	 liberalism	had	 to	 engage	 its	 enemy	 (communism)	 in	 a	
contest	of	values	that	included	an	explicit	military	dimension.	The	eU,	in	contrast,	
has	never	invested	liberalism	with	a	power	dimension	because	the	eU	was	supposed	
to	be	 the	 antithesis	 of	power	 –	 the	permanent	 solution	 to	Franco‑German	 rivalry	
and	balance	of	power	contests.	during	the	cold	War	this	created	a	clear	division	of	
labor	between	the	two	organizations,	and	the	eU	could	invest	 itself	with	the	idea	
that it was a “civilian” power – an idea that today also appears in the literature 
as “normative” power. The EU is therefore poor at thinking politics in terms of 
power	and	devising	strategies	for	handling	it.	To	the	extent	that	the	eU’s	common	
security and defense policy (CSDP) is conceived of as a counter‑project to US policy, 
it merely enhances the irresponsible “civilian” ideology and degrades Europe’s 
capacity	to	deal	with	real	problems.
Worryingly,	nATO	is	drifting	in	the	same	direction	as	the	eU	–	in	the	direction	
of	seeing	politics	as	something	that	can	be	managed	from	without	with	the	aid	of	
economic,	 institutional,	 and	 social	 tools.	nATO	 is	not	 there	yet	 but	 the	direction	
is unmistakable. Consider the DAS and the Albright report, along with most 
nAc	statements:	they	identify	processes	that	must	be	managed	(i.e.,	proliferation,	
terrorism,	energy	security,	cyber	security,	missile	defense),	not	actors	that	must	be	
confronted. NATO focuses on the “supply” side – the fact that globalization makes 
access to certain capabilities easier – but not the “demand” side defined by certain 
actors’ intention to provoke international change, even if by violent means. This is 
particularly	worrisome	because	this	is	nATO,	a	military	alliance	which	is	supposed	
to	focus	on	the	real	issues	but	which	cannot.	Politically	inhibited,	nATO’s	masters	
direct	the	organization	to	plan	for	the	full	spectrum	of	operations	–	and	since	this	
is not possible, to search for solutions by way of multinational projects and role 
specialization	–	and	plan	for	comprehensive	cooperation	with	the	Un,	which	will	
reinforce	its	reluctance	to	identify	culprits	and	confront	them.
The solution to all this is to take politics seriously. It can be done first of all 
by asking the deceptively simple question: what does the West mean today? The 
answer	 will	 involve	 nATO	 because	 nATO	 as	 a	 transatlantic	 body	 is	 the	 most	
obvious	institutional	home	to	the	West	but	it	will	also	involve	nATO‑eU	relations.	
Western leaders need to make sense of the big picture, not the details of this policy 
and	 that	 institution.	 if	 they	 cohere	 at	 the	 strategic	 level,	 institutional	 reform	and	
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policy	impact	will	effort	 if	not	effortlessly,	 then	with	comparative	ease.	 it	 is	a	big	
question,	of	course	–	the	meaning	of	the	West	–	and	answers	may	be	hard	to	come	
by. To focus attention and advance common thinking, Europe could agree to three 
initiatives:
–	 First,	 it	 should	 launch	 a	 common	 and	 permanent	maritime	 presence	 in	 the	
Indian Ocean which is its gateway to booming Asia. It will take Europe 
beyond	 the	occasional	 anti‑piracy	mission	and	 focus	 its	mind	on	 the	pillars	
of	 international	order	and	notably	 the	political	and	strategic	 implications	of	
china’s	rise.
–	 Second,	 it	 should	 invest	 in	 outer	 space	 capabilities	 that	 sustain	 and	protect	
iT	economies.	Outer	space	is	part	of	the	global	commons,	as	is	the	maritime	
space, and investments here force stakeholders to develop a wider policy for, 
again,	the	international	order.
–	 Finally,	 it	 should	 continue	 investing	 in	 Special	 Forces	 for	 counter‑terrorism	
operations,	 which	 it	 currently	 is	 under	 the	 nATO	 umbrella,	 but	 the	 effort	
should	 be	 doubled	 now	 that	 operations	 past	Afghanistan	will	 cause	 a	 shift	
away	from	heavy	and	intractable	cOin	operations.	Special	Forces	operations	
will be less taxing on European forces and public finances but help generate 
common Western understandings of adversaries and political stakes.
If European countries engage these questions and tasks, it might revive its 
underlying	Western	 purpose	 and	 durably	 reform	 itself	 and	 common	 institutions	
–	 both	 the	eU	and	nATO	–	 for	 the	 future.	 it	will	 not	 be	 easy	 but	with	 the	 right	
leadership, it can be done. The easier option is to define the multilateral and 
benevolent	 management	 of	 globalization	 as	 europe’s	 new	 purpose.	 it	 will	 be	
uncontroversial	 but	 it	will	 also	 accelerate	europe’s	 evolution	 into	 a	 blunt	 tool	 in	
the	Un’s	vast	and	ineffective	toolbox.
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